ИКАО - 16.06.1993

Alexis Nekrassov написал(а) к All в Apr 05 16:57:08 по местному времени:

From: "Alexis Nekrassov" <SjudaNePishi@sfr.fr>

ICAO COMPLETES FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION
MONTREAL, 16 June 1993 - The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
has
released a report on the completion of the fact-finding investigation into the
shooting down of a Korean Air
Lines Boeing 747 on 31 August 1983. The investigation was resumed in December
1992 following the
emergence of new evidence, including hand-over of the original flight recorder
tapes by the Russian
Federation.
On Monday 14 June the ICAO Council adopted a resolution closing the
investigation of the
crash of KAL, Flight 007 (KE 007), which was en route to Seoul when it was
shot down by an air-to-air
missile, killing all 269 people on board. (A copy of the text of the
resolution adopted by the Council is
attached.)
The Council resolution appeals urgently to States to ratify the Article 3 bis
of the Chicago
Convention, which reaffirms the fundamental principle of general international
law that States must refrain
from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft. It urges States
to take all necessary measures to
ensure the safety of air navigation of all civil aircraft in compliance with
the relevant rules, standards and
recommended practices enshrined in the Chicago Convention of 1944.
According to the report's main findings, the crew of the Boeing 747 activated
an autopilot
shortly after departure from Anchorage and turned to a heading of 245 degrees
to comply with an air traffic
control (ATC) clearance. KE 007 maintained a heading of 245 degrees from three
minutes after lift-off until
the interception over five hours later. The failure to detect the aircraft's
deviation from its assigned track
for over five hours indicated a lack of situational awareness and flight deck
coordination on the part of the
crew.
The report found that the maintenance of the constant magnetic heading and the
resulting
track deviation was due to the crew's failure to note that the autopilot had
either been left in the heading
mode or had been switched to the inertial navigation system (INS) when the
aircraft was beyond range for
the INS to capture the desired track. The flight crew of KE 007 did not
implement the proper navigation
procedures to ensure the aircraft remained on its assigned track throughout
the flight, resulting in KE 007
eventually penetrating prohibited areas of USSR sovereign airspace.
KE 007 passed 12 nautical miles (NM) north of the Bethel VORTAC navigation aid
and
proceeded west with an increasing northerly deviation from the recognized
airways system. KE 007 continued
through the Alaskan Air Defence Identification Zone and Alaskan Air Command
buffer zone. It was
reported by representatives of the United States that no radar observations
were made of a westbound
aircraft north of route R20 and crossing the Alaskan identification zones.
In the area northeast of Kamchatka Peninsula, a US. intelligence aircraft,
flying in close
proximity to KE 007, resulted in the assumption by the USSR Air Defence that
the aircraft proceeding
towards the USSR was an RC-135. USSR military aircraft attempted to intercept
KE 007 over Kamchatka
Peninsula.
KE 007 then proceeded towards Sakhalin Island. The USSR Air Defence command
centre
personnel on Sakhalin Island were concerned with the identity and position of
the intruder aircraft in relation
to USSR sovereign airspace. The USSR Air Defence command assumed that KE 007
was a United States
RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft before they ordered its destruction.
Exhaustive efforts to identify the aircraft were not made, although apparently
some doubt
remained regarding its identity. It was determined that the intercepting USSR
aircraft did not comply with
the ICAO standards and recommended practices related to the interception of
civil aircraft before the attack
on KE 007. No attempt was made by the USSR to contact the crew of KE 007 by
radio, according to the
report.
KE 007 was hit by at least one of two air-to-air missiles fired from a USSR
SU-15 interceptor
aircraft. There was substantial damage to KE 007 which affected the
controllability of the aircraft and caused
a loss of cabin pressure. The aircraft descended in a spiral and radar contact
was lost at 5,000 metres. It
could not be established whether the crew was able to maintain limited
control. The aircraft was destroyed
on impact with the sea.
There were no indications that the flight crew of KE 007 deliberately
maintained a constant
magnetic heading, the report concluded. The atmosphere on the flight deck of
KE 007 was normal and
relaxed and the crew was not aware of the presence of the USSR interceptor
aircraft before or at the time
of the attack.
Among the new evidence examined by the ICAO investigation team were the
original tapes
of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and digital flight data recorder (DFDR),
recovered by the USSR in 1983
and turned over to ICAO in January 1993. Also made available by
representatives of the Russian Federation
were recordings and transcripts of the communications between the pilots of
the intercepting fighter aircraft
and their ground controllers as well as the communications between the command
centres. The United
States provided certified copies and transcripts of the tapes of
communications with air traffic controllers at
Anchorage, Alaska, and Japan made available air traffic control (ATC) tapes
recorded in Tokyo.
In the course of the investigation, all practical steps were taken to confirm
the authenticity
of the communications tapes. The material on the communications tapes and the
CVR and DFDR tapes
showed no evidence of contradiction with known information and correlated well
with other sources of data.
The CVR and DFDR records established that the aircraft did not sustain an
extensive avionics
or navigation systems failure or malfunction prior to the attack by the USSR
fighter aircraft, the report states.

ane/СТОЙСУКА/kra@fr/СПАММЕР!/ee.fr

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